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1 Introduction
Following the emerging market financial crises of 1997-99, consensus has
emerged that financial stability is an important element in the conduct of
monetary policy; see Goodhart and Illing (2002), Svensson (2002), and Svens-
son and Woodford (2003).1 A central bank with explicit responsibility for
financial stability would have a clearer mandate to respond to the build-up
of financial imbalances even if monetary stability did not appear to be un-
der threat. However, little work has been done on the welfare implications
of financial stability as a distinct monetary policy objective, particularly in
emerging market economies.
The key premise of this paper is that a welfare assessment has to con-
sider the link between financial stability concerns and the credibility deficit
often facing policymakers in developing countries. We explore this link by
extending the symmetric preferences of the benchmark Barro and Gordon
(1983) discretionary policy model with one-sided aversion to exchange rate
depreciation. The recent adoption by many developing countries of floating
exchange rates coupled with an inflation target has reinstated the policy rel-
evance of the Barro-Gordon framework, which had earlier lost its appeal to
1Indeed, Borio, Filardo and English (2003) report that, since the mid-1980s, the rapid
pace of financial liberalization has led to more frequent financial booms and busts in
developed and developing countries alike.
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self-fulfilling models of the authorities’ decision to defend a fixed exchange
rate under speculative pressure; see Obstfeld (1994, 1996) and Jeanne and
Masson (2000).2 Further, the lack of precommitment in the Barro-Gordon
model reflects a tendency by policymakers in developing countries to use
inflation surprises to improve the government’s fiscal position.
We are motivated by two stylized empirical observations. First, devel-
oping country policymakers typically pursue macroeconomic stabilization
against a background of significant financial fragility, involving a negatively
skewed supply shock distribution and substantial balance-sheet mismatch.
The latter occurs along both currency and maturity dimensions as the fi-
nancial sector’s liabilities are predominantly dollar-denominated and short-
term, while its assets are home currency-denominated and long-term. Conse-
quently, Kamisky and Reinhart (1999) find that devaluations in financially-
fragile economies tend to be recessionary. Although initially restricted to
the financial sector, a devaluation’s aftershocks spread to other sectors and
result in widespread corporate failure and unemployment.
Second, although many developing countries responded to the financial
crises by adopting a floating exchange rate coupled with an inflation target–
2Emerging markets adopting inflation targeting since the Asian financial crises include
Brazil (June 1999), Colombia (September 1999), the Czech Republic (January 1998),
South Korea (January 1998), Mexico (January 1999), Poland (October 1998), South Africa
(February 2000) and Thailand (April 2000).
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the latter serving as a nominal anchor–in practice there is extensive fear of
floating. As documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002), nominal inter-
est rates in financially-fragile developing economies are much more volatile
than expected future depreciation, leading to massive rejection of the risk-
neutral version of Uncovered Interest Parity. Indeed, post-crisis economies
continue to actively manage their currencies so as to limit exchange rate
fluctuations, and there is strong evidence of fear of floating for a wide cross
section of countries formally classified as ‘floaters’ by the IMF.3
Against that background, we assume that the policy weight attached to
fear of floating–originating with financial fragility concerns–is independent
of the weight on inflation stabilization. This contrasts with the literature
on optimal contracts for central bankers (Walsh (1995, 2003)). There, it
is the coeﬃcient on current inflation which measures the optimal penalty
factor, and its magnitude is derived endogenously as function of the structural
and preference fundamentals. As a result, expected inflation bias can be
eliminated. Further, whereas inWalsh (1995) only current inflation enters the
loss function, our one-period loss function stresses the role of inflation change
(or, with PPP, depreciation change) as the prime determinant of financial
fragility. It follows that, as the eﬀects of the current inflation choice are
3See Calvo (2005), Ganapolsky (2003), Lahiri and Végh (2001), Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2005), McKinnon and Schnabl (2004), and Reinhart (2000).
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incorporated in next period’s payoﬀ, the central bank’s discount factor–or
degree of parience–matters for average policy outcomes.4 We thus introduce
one-period persistence into the reduced-form model and solve a dynamic
problem for the central bank assuming that its choice of inflation last period
aﬀects expected welfare this period.
The main results are as follows. First, asymmetric aversion to exchange
rate change imparts deflation bias to the economy, mitigating excess inflation
due to time-inconsistency. Given the relative magnitude of the asymmetric
preference coeﬃcient, the deflationary impact of fear of floating decreases
with the central bank’s discount factor. Thus, to the extent that policy-
makers in financially-fragile developing countries tend to be constrained by
shorter time horizons than their counterparts in advanced economies, the
resulting decline in inflation bias is bigger.
Second, we show that optimal policy outcomes under fear of floating do
not always yield higher expected welfare than the symmetric Barro-Gordon
benchmark. The net impact of fear of floating is sensitive to the economy’s
recent inflation (depreciation) record, the extent of the credibility problem in
monetary policy, and the policymaker’s discount factor. Specifically, under
symmetric information the supply shocks are observed by the private sector,
hence they directly aﬀect welfare. Adverse supply shocks in the last period
4We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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improve expected welfare with fear of floating for the current period, all else
equal. Although adverse shocks are suﬃcient for fear of floating to outper-
form the symmetric loss function, they are necessary only if monetary policy
is fully credible. In the more realistic developing-country case where credibil-
ity is weak, fear of floating can improve upon the Barro-Gordon benchmark
even if the last supply shock was expansionary. In contrast, if the mone-
tary policy is fully credible and the last shock is favorable, the symmetric
benchmark is preferred on average.
Ceteris paribus, we also find that higher discount factors–amounting to
longer policy horizons for central bankers–tend to generate higher average
welfare with fear of floating, particularly if monetary policy credibility is
strong. Conversely, lower discount factors have the opposite eﬀect unless
credibility is weak. We argue that the conditionality implicit in this result
may be consistent with the “new-environment” (post-crises) view of mon-
etary policy put forward by Borio, Filardo and English (2003), according
to which central banks should place more weight on safeguarding financial
stability also in developed economies, where credibility is not an issue.
Third, the model can shed light on the result of Lahiri and Végh (2001)
that fear of foating delivers less variable inflation than the symmetric bench-
mark. Curiously, this empirical regularity that is despite the fact that coun-
tries with less variable inflation also tend to be subject to larger external
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shocks. Assuming that the asymmetric preference coeﬃcient follows an
AR(1) process which covaries negatively with supply shocks, so that adverse
supply shocks and fear of floating are positively correlated, we show that fear
of floating delivers less variable inflation if the policymaker’s discount factor
is above a certain threshold. Thus, a longer policymaking horizon pays oﬀ
in terms of lower inflation variability.
The paper’s reduced-form approach is common to research on asymmetric
policy preferences for the U.S. and other advanced economies; see Nobay and
Peel (2003) and Ruge Murcia (2003a,b), among others. In that literature, the
rationale for extending the monetary policy loss function involves asymmetric
preferences over macroeconomic stabilization: depending on the inflation
outcome, recession aversion may exceed inflation aversion or vice versa.
The preference asymmetry in Nobay and Peel (2003) is nonlinear (linex)
and more general than the one considered here. In our case, positive de-
viations from target contribute an extra loss that is linear in last period’s
change in inflation/depreciation. This keeps the key result that k = 0 is not
suﬃcient for eliminating does not remove inflation bias. On account of the
extra term, the change in expected inflation is unambiguously negative, i.e.
expected appreciation. Inflation bias is independent of the higher moments of
shocks. However, actual inflation exhibits 1-period path dependence, which
may be more relevant for developing countries, as they face more extreme
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shocks than advanced economies.
In that respect, the paper is also motivated by research on the impact of
path-dependence on optimal monetary policy choice; see Drazen and Masson
(1995). Whereas the methodology of these authors is related to second-
generation models of conditional escape clauses from a fixed exchange rate
mechanism, our approach follows that of third generation crisis models stress-
ing the role of financial fragility; see Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004),
Calvo (1998, 2005) and Chang and Velasco (2000, 2001).
Our findings can be seen to oﬀer theoretical support for the recent empir-
ical survey of Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006). Using de facto exchange
rate data from a large number of countries, these authors report that ‘heavily
managed’ floating exchange rates continue to be more popular for emerging
markets and developing countries than advanced economies.5 Applying the
transition matrix methodology of Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2005), they also
forecast that the first two country groups will only gradually move away from
fear of floating, and indeed the move will extend beyond a 20-year horizon.
Significantly, the strong persistence of intermediate, rather than “bipolar”
exchange rate regimes is positively related to countries’ reluctance to lift
capital controls, as found also by Von Hagen and Zhou (2006). Hence, to the
5Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia’s (2006) dataset comprises 24 advanced economies, 32
emerging markets, and 131 developing countries from 1990-2004.
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extent that maintaining capital controls is reflecting policymakers’ concerns
about financial fragility, the present framework highlights the implications of
such concerns for average social welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the one-period Barro-
Gordon discretionary monetary policy model. Section 3 extends this bench-
mark with a value function incorporating asymmetric depreciation aversion;
obtains the average policy outcomes; and derives expected social welfare.
Section 4 compares the two welfare alternatives and discusses the policy im-
plications for developing countries; and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Barro-Gordon benchmark
Let s, p and p∗ denote the logs of the nominal exchange rate and the home
and foreign price levels, respectively. Assuming PPP and constant foreign
prices implies ∆st = pt − pt−1 = πt, so depreciation and inflation coincide.
PPP eﬀectively converts the policymaker’s inflation target to a target depre-
ciation rate; see Calvo and Reinhart (2001) and Ho and McCauley (2003) for
evidence that exchange rate pass-through is significantly higher in developing
than industrialized countries.
The one-period quadratic-symmetric policy loss function is
LBGt = (yt − y∗)2 + χ(πt − π∗)2 , (1)
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where χ > 0 is the symmetric preference coeﬃcient, i.e. the relative weight
on inflation stabilization. The inflation and output growth targets π∗ ≥ 0
and y∗ ≥ 0 are constant, wlog. It is common to assume that equation (1)
also describes social welfare, so in the sequel we interchangeably refer to the
policymaker’s and society’s losses.
Output growth follows the short-run aggregate supply function
yt = y + α(πt − Et−1πt) + εt , (2)
where Et−1πt is determined at t − 1, α is the economy’s inverse sacrifice
ratio, and εt is an iid (0, σε) aggregate supply shock independent of πt. Im-
portantly, the short-term output growth target, y∗, can exceed the economy’s
long-term potential, y, by y∗ − y = k > 0. The magnitude of k is inversely
related to the credibility of monetary policy. In developing and emerging
market economies, in particular, k > 0 reflects policymakers’ tendency of
using inflation surprises to improve the government’s fiscal position. Overre-
liance on the inflation tax lowers the real value of government debt and erodes
public sector wages. Thus, although in principle one can allow for k = 0,
reflecting prudent discretion by the monetary authority (Blinder (2000)) this
is arguably unrealistic for developing countries, especially in the aftermath
of financial crises.6
6The expansionary motive associated with k > 0 may also reflect labor market dis-
tortions and/or political business cycle considerations relevant for advanced economies.
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Minimizing (1) subject to (2) and taking expectations using all informa-
tion available at t − 1 yields the Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983) inflation bias result: the short-term expansionary motive
delivers average inflation above target with no average output gain
biasBGt = Et−1π
BG
t − π∗ =
kα
χ
> 0 , EBGt−1yt = y (3)
where BG denotes optimal policy outcomes in the Barro-Gordon model.
Equilibrium inflation and output growth and their variabilities are
πBGt = π
∗ +
kα
χ
− α
α2 + χ
εt , yBGt = y +
χ
α2 + χ
εt
varπBGt =
α2
(α2 + χ)2
σ2ε , vary
BG
t =
χ2
(α2 + χ)2
σ2ε (4)
It follows that average welfare declines at the square of inflation bias
Et−1LBGt = Et−1[(yt − y∗)2 + χ(πt − π∗)2]
= varyBGt + χ(bias
BG)2
Substituting (3) and (4) to this expression yields
Et−1LBGt =
χ
α2 + χ
σ2ε +
k2α2
χ
+ 2kαπ∗ + χπ∗2 (5)
Hence, when monetary policy is guided by the symmetric losses in (1)
social welfare deteriorates with the expansionary motive, driving the case
See Walsh (2003) for a review of the sources of, and responses to, time-inconsistency in
monetary policy.
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for overcoming time-inconsistency using a reputational mechanism and/or
commitment technology to set k = 0. Note that a more ambitious inflation
target is also welfare-improving, all else equal.
3 Monetary policy with fear of floating
3.1 Asymmetric aversion to exchange rate change
In the presence of nominal wage rigidities, alternative microfoundations for
the cost of exchange rate fluctuations turn on the negative impact of exchange
rate changes on output and employment. A rationale for fear of floating then
arises through the real costs of exchange rate variability, so fluctuations are
costly regardless of the direction of movement; see, for example, Lahiri and
Végh (2001). In this paper we, instead, assume that depreciation of the home
currency involves a social cost independent of stabilization eﬀorts. The extra
cost is motivated by foreign currency exposure of the corporate sector and
the resulting financial fragility.
As discussed in the Introduction, monetary policy preferences may be
asymmetric if a substantial component of the financial sector’s liabilities is
dollarized; exchange rate devaluations can then often be recessionary, and
appreciations expansionary. In this context, it is often developing coun-
tries’ original sin–defined as the de facto inability to borrow in their home
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currency–which underlies financial fragility and induces fear of floating.7
We thus propose capturing asymmetric aversion to exchange rate fluctu-
ations using the one-period loss function
LFFt = (yt − y∗)2 + χ(πt − π∗)2 + 2ϕ∆πt , ϕ > 0 (6)
where ∆πt = πt − πt−1 is the one-period change in inflation. Coeﬃ-
cient ϕ captures the policy maker’s asymmetric aversion to exchange rate
depreciation, while χ measures the (symmetric) weight on inflation versus
output stabilization. Importantly, the strength of fear of floating is assumed
independent of χ because the underlying financial fragility is taken as given.
Thus, the relative magnitudes of ϕ and χ reflect the weight of fear of floating
and inflation stabilization as independent monetary policy objectives.
Note that the linear term in loss function (6) will only add a constant
to the first-order condition. This contrasts with the nonlinear (linex) pref-
erences of Nobay and Peel (2003), where positive inflation deviations from
target change the slope of the loss function. In their very flexible reduced-
form, the magnitude of excess inflation depends on higher moments of supply
shocks. The authors then need to assume that actual inflation is condition-
ally normally distributed in order to get closed form solutions for expected
inflation. We argue that, despite the consequent greater generality, this as-
7On the symbiotic relationship between financial fragility and original sin in developing
countries see the contributions in Eichengreen and Hausmann (2004).
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sumption does not fit the experience of developing countries experiencing
sharp devaluations.
The specification of loss function (6) is similar to that of the literature
on optimal central bank contracts, introduced by Walsh (1995). There, the
additional linear term is interpreted as a linear contract between the central
bank and the government. However, the central bank is penalized for higher
inflation, so it is the level and not the first-diﬀerence of inflation which enters
the loss function. Walsh then shows there is an optimal level of the penalty
factor which eliminates inflation bias, and that level is linear in actual infla-
tion : t(πt) = t0− αkχ πt. Thus, given πt the optimal linear contract penalizes
the central bank relatively more the higher is k.8
By contrast, in our model the strength of fear of floating (ϕ) is exoge-
nously determined by the underlying fragility of the banking and corporate
sector, whose degree of foreign currency exposure and risk of devaluation due
to sharp reversals on capital account–Calvo’s “sudden stops”–are in princi-
ple both unrelated to the central bank’s inflation aversion. Moreover, as it is
the one-period change in inflation/ depreciation matters to current welfare,
the central bank takes into account the eﬀects of its previous inflation choice
on this period’s payoﬀ. Therefore, the one-period loss function LFFt from
8In Nobay and Peel (2003) the variances of inflation and output also depend on t(·),
the optimal penalty factor.
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equation (6) enters recursively into the following value function V (·)
V (πt−1) = max{πt}
£
(yt − y∗)2 + χ(πt − π∗)2 + 2ϕ(πt − πt−1) + βEt−1V (πt)
¤
(7)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the policy discount factor, assumed constant for simplicity.
3.2 Optimal monetary policy
We proceed to solve the central bank’s dynamic optimization problem. Sub-
stituting linear Phillips curve (2) into value function (7) implies
V (πt−1) = max{πt}
(y + απt − αEt−1πt + εt − y∗)2 + χ(πt − π∗)2 (8)
+2ϕ(πt − πt−1) + βEt−1V (πt)
Maximizing (8) with respect to πt and applying the envelope theorem
V 0(πt−1) = −2ϕ, yields the first-order condition
α(y + απt − αEt−1πt + εt − y∗) + χ(πt − π∗) = ϕ(β − 1) (9)
Taking expectations at t− 1, the average policy outcomes, denoted FF ,
are just
biasFFt = Et−1π
FF
t − π∗ =
kα− ϕ(1− β)
χ
< biasBGt (10)
Et−1yFFt = Et−1y
BG
t = y
The deflationary impact of fear of floating is −ϕ(1−β)/χ < 0, mitigating ex-
cess inflation under the Barro-Gordon benchmark with no change to average
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output growth. Provided ϕ > 0, note that the reduction in average inflation
decreases in the discount factor β. Thus, the deflationary contribution of
asymmetric aversion to exchange rate depreciation declines with the central
bank’s rate of time preference.
Substituting (10) into (9) yields period-t equilibrium inflation and output
growth
πFFt = π
∗ +
kα− ϕ(1− β)
χ
− α
α2 + χ
εt (11)
yFFt = y +
χ
α2 + χ
εt
Comparing equations (11) and (4) suggests that inflation and output vari-
ability are unchanged from the Barro-Gordon benchmark. That is because
optimality condition (9) is still linear in the current supply shock. However,
equilibrium inflation/depreciation bias is lower on account of fear of floating.
As a result, the implications for average welfare are non-trivial.
3.3 Equilibrium social welfare
Expected welfare losses under fear of floating combine the output variability
and squared inflation bias terms, due to symmetric losses, with the social
cost of financial fragility
Et−1LFFt = vary
FF
t + χ(bias
FF
t )
2 + 2ϕEt−1∆πFFt =
χ
α2 + χ
σ2ε +
1
χ
[kα− ϕ(1− β)]2 + 2ϕα
α2 + χ
εt−1 (12)
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As output variability is unchanged under the alternative loss functions, their
expected welfare diﬀerential reduces to
Et−1∆Lt ≡ Et−1LFFt −Et−1LBGt
= χ
£
(biasFFt )
2 − (biasBGt )2
¤
+ 2ϕEt−1∆πFFt (13)
If the above expression is positive [negative], fear of floating generates
higher [lower ] expected welfare losses than the symmetric benchmark. Sub-
stituting in (13) the inflation bias expressions, from (3) and (10), and the
diﬀerence between expected inflation for period t and actual inflation at t−1
under fear of floating, from (11), yields
Et−1∆Lt =
ϕ(1− β)
χ
[ϕ(1− β)− 2kα] + 2ϕα
α2 + χ
εt−1 (14)
Thus, placing more policy weight on inflation stabilization (χ) narrows
the average welfare gap between the two loss functions. Given χ > 0, the
expected welfare gap is a function of: the relative importance of asymmetric
depreciation aversion, captured by ϕ; the latest shock realization εt−1; the
policymaker’s discount factor or “degree of patience” β; and the economy’s
sacrifice ratio 1/α. The dependence of average welfare on β reflects the one-
period persistence built into the preference asymmetry.
The first two terms in (14) combine the welfare impact of fear of floating,
imperfect credibility, and the policymaker’s rate of time preference. Note that
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−2kαϕ(1−β)/χ < 0 for all k > 0.9 Therefore, less credible monetary policy
strengthens the case for fear of floating in the loss function, ceteris paribus.
Conversely, building up credibility–for example, by legislating central bank
independence into the constitution–weakens the case for fear of floating for
all ϕ > 0.
Equation (14) yields a necessary and suﬃcient condition for fear of float-
ing to outperform the Barro-Gordon benchmark in expectation
Et−1∆Lt < 0⇔
1− β
χ
[ϕ(1− β)− 2αk] + 2α
α2 + χ
εt−1 < 0 (15)
Inequality (15) implies the following upper bound for asymmetric prefer-
ence coeﬃcient ϕ in order for fear of floating to be preferred10
ϕ < ϕmax =
2α
1− β
∙
k − χ
(α2 + χ)(1− β) εt−1
¸
(16)
The magnitude of ϕmax then acts as a “welfare threshold” for the presence
of fear of floating. Put diﬀerently, a necessary condition for fear of floating
to arise is ϕmax > 0. In the next Section we examine the welfare link between
credibility problems, fear of floating and the economy’s inflation record.
9From equations (5) and (12), expected welfare losses under the benchmark and fear
of floating both include a term in k2, so that cancels out of their diﬀerence.
10Barro-Gordon does better on average if ϕ > ϕmax, and the policymaker is indiﬀerent
between the two welfare alternatives if ϕ = ϕmax.
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4 Policy implications for developing countries
4.1 Comparative welfare evaluation
We first address the case of full credibility. When k = 0, (16) implies that
any favorable shock at t−1 induces ϕmax < 0. The inequality is then violated
for all ϕ > 0. This is represented graphically in Figure 1 below, plotting a
3-dimensional surface of the expected welfare gain from fear of floating over
the Barro-Gordon benchmark, i.e. minus the expected loss diﬀerential in
equation (14), for an arbitrary positive supply shock, εt−1 = 0.0411
FIGURE 1 HERE
The symmetric and asymmetric alternatives perform better, respectively,
towards the lower (blue) and upper (red) ends of the color spectrum. To
facilitate the comparison, we also show the flat ‘zero plane’ where the welfare
alternatives are at par (Et−1∆Lt = 0). The case k = 0 corresponds to points
along the vertical (ϕ) axis. Note that the expected gain from fear of floating
is always negative–the welfare surface lies below the zero plane–hence the
Barro-Gordon benchmark is preferred.
11For illustration purposes we fix α = χ = 1, β = 0.95 and σε = 0.12, and let k and ϕ
vary from zero to 1 and 1.2 in steps of size 0.1. This generates a grid of 143 points for
[k, ϕ] over which we evaluate the expected welfare gain from fear of floating. The x, y and
z-axes represent k, ϕ and −Et−1∆Lt, respectively.
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Turning to the general case of imperfect credibility, k > 0, inequality (16)
suggests policymakers then have a greater ϕmax threshold. In Figure 1, the
expected gain from fear of floating grows smoothly with k; for the particular
parameter and shock values, the welfare surface crosses the zero plane near
k = 0.4. If credibility weakens further then fear of floating outperforms the
benchmark. When k > 0, Figure 1 also shows that the welfare surface slopes
up along the ϕ-axis. The expected gain from fear of floating rises with the
asymmetric preference coeﬃcient; it is greatest in the red region when k and
ϕ are both large. Thus, credibility problems help explain why developing
countries are likely to have bigger ϕmax values than industrialized countries.
Faced with imperfect credibility, developing-country policymakers tend to be
more reluctant to let their home currency depreciate then their counterparts
in developed economies where time-inconsistency is not an issue and k is near
zero.
We next analyze the case of adverse supply shocks at t − 1. From the
last term in expression (16), any εt−1 < 0 results in higher ϕmax, hence fear
of floating outperforms the benchmark for a wider range of shocks.12 The
welfare comparison for the same parameter values as above and εt−1 = −0.11
is shown in Figure 2
12An adverse shock realization at t − 1 is suﬃcient for ϕmax > 0 and, if k = 0, also
necessary.
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FIGURE 2 HERE
The expected welfare gain from fear of floating is now in the range [0, 0.35],
compared to [−0.06, 0.08] in Figure 1. Indeed, the zero plane lies below the
welfare surface at every point on the [k, ϕ] grid, so the two welfare alternatives
are at par only in the degenerate case of no fear of floating (ϕ = 0).
The stronger case for asymmetric preferences relates to value function
(7). Recall that any non-zero shock at t − 1 is observed by the private
sector, so the expected welfare gap for period t depends on the previous
inflation rate. The additional losses due to the change in depreciation in-
troduce path-dependence to the model, and that is independent of the rate
of time preference. Path-dependence is asymmetric: adverse supply shocks
improve average welfare under fear of floating while favorable ones render it
more costly. Intuitively, the underlying financial fragility becomes highly rel-
evant, or salient, immediately following a severe financial crisis triggered by
devaluation. Therefore, to the extent that developing and emerging market
economies tend to be chararacterized by negatively skewed shock distribu-
tions, fear of floating behavior is more appropriate from a welfare point if
view.
Lastly, we assess the welfare impact of changes to the central bank’s rate
of time preference. Diﬀerentiating equation (14) with respect to β yields
∂Et−1∆Lt
∂β =
2ϕ
χ [kα − ϕ(1 − β)]. With imperfect credibility, and assuming β
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is not too small this expression is positive, suggesting that ϕ > 0 becomes
more costly with a higher discount factor. If k is at or close to zero, however,
then ∂Et−1∆Lt∂β < 0 for all β ∈ (0, 1). Ceteris paribus, higher β then implies
that the expected welfare gain from fear of floating increases.
These comparative statics are supported by Figure 3 below, graphing the
behavior of −Et−1∆Lt against k and ϕ.
FIGURE 3 HERE
The top panel combines the favorable shock from Figure 1 (εt−1 = 0.04)
with β = 0.30, without loss of generality.13 Asymmetric preferences un-
ambiguously lower average welfare for k smaller than about 0.2. However,
if credibility worsens (k > 0.2) then fear of floating still outperforms the
benchmark. This property is also highlighted in the lower panel of Figure 3,
combining a large adverse shock and low discount factor, εt−1 = −0.11 and
β = 0.30. Note that, compared to the top panel, less of the [k, ϕ] grid now
lies below the zero plane. Thus, the earlier implication that ϕ > 0 improves
average welfare following adverse supply shocks is robust to the discount
factor, provided credibility is imperfect.
Equivalently, lower discount factors render fear of floating less appropri-
ate than the Barro-Gordon benchmark, particularly if credibility is strong.
13Welfare surfaces conditional on diﬀerent β and εt−1 combinations are available upon
request.
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If credibility problems are persistent, however, then fear of floating outper-
forms the benchmark even with a low discount factor. Interestingly, such
conditioning of the average welfare performance on policymakers’ progress
on the credibility front is in line with Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia’s (2006)
projection that developing-country policymakers will only gradually aban-
don ‘intermediate’ exchange rate regimes and float their currencies. These
authors’ forward-looking conclusion is that, as emerging market economies
build up their institutions and develop liquid financial markets, they enter
a virtuous circle (a ‘path to prudence’) through which fear of floating will
remain attractive.
In the context of industrialized countries–whose k is arguably smaller
than developing countries–the finding that fear of floating combined with
large β improves average welfare is also related to the “new-environment
view” of monetary policy (Borio et al. (2003)). According to that view, cen-
tral banks in advanced economies need to place greater weight on financial
(and exchange rate) imbalances when calibrating monetary policy; they may,
consequently, also require a longer horizon for evaluating policy alternatives.
Thus, proxying longer policymaking horizons with higher β values, this find-
ing appears consistent with the new-environment view that financial stability
may be an independent objective of monetary policy, also when credibility is
perfect.
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4.2 Fear of floating and inflation variability
A key observation of Lahiri and Végh (2001) is that fear of floating results
in less variable inflation rates in countries which are subject to larger shocks.
That is, instead of a monotonic relationship between nominal exchange rate
variability and the size of supply shocks, the extra cost of currency deprecia-
tion appears to lower inflation variability in developing economies displaying
fear of floating behavior.
If fear of floating is considered to be time-varying, then our reduced-form
framework can shed light on this stylized fact. To illustrate, assume that
asymmetric preference coeﬃcient ϕ follows the stationary process
ϕt = θϕt−1 − εt (17)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) measures the persistence of ϕt, and εt is the period-t
supply shock. Equation (17) implies the covariance between ϕt and εt is
always negative: cov(ϕt, εt) = −σ2ε < 0. Following the discussion in Section
3.1, the intuition is that the underlying financial fragility deteriorates with
adverse supply shocks. Hence, adverse shocks induce more fear of floating
while favorable shocks have the opposite eﬀect.
Substituting (17) into equation (11), equilibrium inflation variability un-
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der fear of floating becomes
varπFFt =
∙
α2
(α2 + χ)2
+
(1− β)2
χ2(1− θ2)
¸
σ2ε +
2α(1− β)
χ(α2 + χ)
cov(ϕt, εt) =
∙
α2
(α2 + χ)2
+
(1− β)2
χ2(1− θ2)
− 2α(1− β)
χ(α2 + χ)
¸
σ2ε (18)
Note that inflation variability increases with σ2ε by the constant factor
of proportionality in square brackets Thus, in comparing inflation variabil-
ity under fear of floating with its equilibrium value in the Barro-Gordon
model, from equation (4), supply shock variability cancels out, and the rela-
tive position of the two welfare alternatives will depend only on reduced-form
parameters α, β, χ and θ.
Comparing expressions (4) and (18), the asymmetric alternative delivers
less variable inflation than the Barro-Gordon benchmark, varπFFt < varπBGt ,
if and only if
β > βmin = 1−
2αχ(1− θ2)
α2 + χ
(19)
Inequality (19) suggests that the volatility comparison is driven by a
lower bound for the central bank’s discount factor. For values of β above
(below) βmin, fear of floating generates less (more) volatile inflation than the
benchmark.14 To build intuition for this result, from equation (18) note that
bigger discount factors lower the contribution of σ2ε on inflation variability at
14From the RHS of (19) it is easy to check that ∂βmin∂θ and
∂βmin
∂χ are both positive, while
∂βmin
∂α > 0 for α
2 > χ and negative otherwise.
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a quadratic rate, but raise the contribution of cov(ϕt, εt) = −σ2ε at a linear
rate. The net impact of a longer policymaking horizon is then to lower equi-
librium inflation variability under fear of floating. We tentatively conclude
that the stylized fact of Lahiri and Végh (2001) is consistent with one-sided
depreciation aversion provided the central bank is suﬃciently “patient”.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper presented an explicit welfare evaluation between the loss func-
tion of the Barro-Gordon discretionary model, on one hand, and monetary
policy preferences displaying asymmetric aversion to exchange rate deprecia-
tion in addition to the ‘twin’ objectives of inflation and output stabilization,
on the other. Persistent fear of floating behavior by policymakers arises be-
cause financial fragility has adverse systemic spillovers. For emerging market
economies, in particular, there is growing consensus that output costs are
significantly higher when financial crises coincide with currency crises.
It was found that average social welfare does not unambiguously improve
when the central bank employs the asymmetric loss function. The expected
welfare diﬀerential of fear of floating vis-à-vis the benchmark depends on the
underlying financial fragility, the credibility of the monetary policy frame-
work, the economy’s recent inflation experience, and on the policymaker’s
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rate of time preference. Conditional on these influences the results indicate
that, while accounting for financial fragility can improve average social wel-
fare for developing and developed economies alike, fear of floating behavior is
better suited to the former than the latter group. Finally, the welfare impact
of the discount factor and credibility concerns appears consistent with recent
empirical work suggesting that de facto floating exchange rates are chosen
by countries at intermediate stages of development adopting a gradualist
approach to liberalizing their capital account.
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